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Abstract
In this article we trace the development of two narratives describing social media that informed much of internet schol‐
arship. One draws from McLuhan’s axiom positing that communication networks would bring forth a ‘global village,’ a
deliberate contradiction in terms to foreground the seamless integration of villages into a global community. Social media
would shrink the world and reshape it into a village by moving information instantaneously from any location at any time.
By leveraging network technology, it would further increase the density of connections within and across social commu‐
nities, thereby integrating geographic and cultural areas into a village stretching across the globe. The second narrative
comprises a set of metaphors equally inspired by geography but emphasizing instead identity and tribalism as opposed
to integration and cooperation. Both narratives are spatially inspired and foreground real‐world consequences, either by
supporting cooperation or by ripping apart the fabric of society. They nonetheless offer opposing accounts of commu‐
nication networks: the first is centered on communication and collaboration, and the second highlights polarization and
division. The article traces the theoretical and technological developments driving these competing narratives and argues
that a digitally enabled global society may in fact reinforce intergroup boundaries and outgroup stereotyping typical of
geographically situated communities.
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1. Introduction
For all the undoubted emphasis in literary criticism
and communication theory associated with the Toronto
School of Communication, it also offered a spatial
research program with lasting impact on internet stud‐
ies. This stream of research was distinctly developed
in the works of Eric Havelock and Harold Innis, the
latter of whom offered an intensely geographic explo‐
ration of communication networks (Barnes, 1993; Innis,
2007). It also transpired in the late work of Marshall
McLuhan that came to be associated with the school,
particularly the axiomata about the media. McLuhan’s
first axiom was neither spatial nor political and stated
that mass media were extensions of man, as technol‐
ogy enhanced the physical and nervous systems of
individuals and increased their information processing
capacity (Carey, 1967). The second axiom, a footnote
to Innis’ observations on the psychic and social conse‐
quences of communication, asserted that the medium
was itself the message because the meaning of a mes‐
sage was ultimately affected by the symbiotic relation‐
ship between the medium and the content being com‐
municated (McLuhan, 1962).
But it was the third axiom, a deeply geographic
metaphor, that resonated with those envisaging global
networks: communication networks would bring forth
a ‘global village,’ purposely coined as a contradiction in
terms foregrounding the seamless integration of villages
into a global community. Electronic media would shrink
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the world and reshape it into a single village by mov‐
ing information instantaneously from any location on the
planet at the same time. Network and telecommunica‐
tion technologies would increase the density of connec‐
tionswithin and across social groups, thereby integrating
geographic and cultural areas into a village that stretched
across the globe (McLuhan, 1964). In short, global net‐
work infrastructure would change the balance between
communication and spatial distance and put into effect
McLuhan’s vision of a global village.
Another narrative, largely opposed to the notion of a
global village, emerged in the late 2010s and influenced
much of the recent internet scholarship. It was built
on reports of extensive filter bubbles, echo‐chamber
communication, and the widespread balkanization of
internet communities (Flaxman et al., 2016; Fletcher
& Nielsen, 2017; Pariser, 2012; Tucker et al., 2018).
The prevalence of this narrative was arguably trig‐
gered by the deployment of data‐driven micro‐targeting
in political campaigning epitomized by the Cambridge
Analytica data scandal and the ensuing data lockdown
enforced by social media platforms. Since then, digital
trace data has been increasingly linked to disinforma‐
tion, misinformation, and influence operations across
Western industrialized democracies and countries in the
Global South, where state and non‐state actors seek to
strategically diffuse content that heightens partisanship
and erodes the general trust in democratic institutions
(Walker et al., 2019).
These metaphors refer to two milestones in how
internet scholarship theorizes social media and net‐
working technology: first it was perceived and concep‐
tualized as a force for integration, only to be subse‐
quently defined as force for polarization. In the following
we unpack the theoretical tensions between spatially
inspired narratives that either foreground cooperation
or division against the backdrop of large‐scale influence
operations and a landscape of disinformation. We con‐
clude with an assessment that while networking technol‐
ogy may well produce a globally interconnected society,
it nevertheless continues to support intergroup bound‐
aries and outgroup stereotyping typical of geographically
situated communities (Hampton & Wellman, 2020).
2. From Global Village to Identity Tribes
2.1. Global Village
The suggestion of a global village exudes the formulaic
optimism of the 1960s but managed to leave a last‐
ing imprint on the discussion about the internet in the
1990s. In the years leading up to the dotcom bubble,
digital communication was thought to bring the world
together, both geographically and politically. During the
late 1990s, particularly in the second half of the decade
that led to the dotcom bubble, technology pundits and
observers forecast that the impact of distance would
be progressively diminished by communications technol‐
ogy (Cairncross, 1997). This narrative gained currency
in the emerging field of internet studies even if studies
continued to report that geographic proximity remained
a critical factor in building relationships and that the
negative impacts of distance on cooperation were only
partially mitigated by network technology (Kiesler &
Cummings, 2002).
In other words, the term global village epitomized
the shrinking of the world into one village through the
use of social and digital media. Since its prescient for‐
mulation by McLuhan (1964), the metaphor was popu‐
larized to explain the internet, where physical distance
is even less of a constrain on the communication activ‐
ity of users. boyd (2008) argued that the global village
metaphor continues to describe effectively how digital
communication empowers personal relationships across
vast geographic and cultural differences. In this alterna‐
tive rendering of the global village, digital communica‐
tion tools were used primarily to maintain relationships
with people in close physical and social proximity instead
of initiating relations with strangers. Friendster, a sem‐
inal social networking site predating Facebook, simply
provided a tool for scaling up social networks rooted in
proximate social relations and representing this dynamic
to the community.
But the scaling of geographically‐situated social net‐
works to online platforms is not a perfect mirror, if it
is a mirror at all, of social relationships established in
one’s immediate surroundings. boyd (2008) noted that
the social graph of Friendster users with numerous com‐
mon ties offered a good indication of severed relation‐
ships. Whenever user A and user B shared many friends
in common, but were not friends themselves, there was
a good indication that this was due to a severed personal
connection, not a social opportunity. This is in sharp
contrast with the dynamics of social relations observed
offline, where exes cannot be simply deleted from one’s
life while also maintaining the social network that sup‐
ported their previous relationship. In other words, the
Friendster network was not merely mirroring offline
social networks, but creating a disparate versionwith par‐
allel albeit adjoining rules of engagement (boyd, 2008).
This persistent McLuhanian account of online social
networks informed much of early internet research
where social platforms were framed as a window to
social contexts and local communities. It also provided
the theoretical framework to a large body of scholarship
praising the democratization of public discourse brought
by open platforms and networked publics (Howard &
Hussain, 2013). During this period, the open infrastruc‐
ture of networked publics was explored in scholarship
detailing how online social networks supported gate‐
watching (Bruns, 2005) and practices in citizen jour‐
nalism that are central to a diverse media ecosystem
(Hermida, 2010), with citizens auditing the gatekeep‐
ing power of mainstream media and holding elite inter‐
ests to account (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). By most
assessments, social network sites were genuine chal‐
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lengers to the monopoly enjoyed by the mass media
(Castells, 2012).
This body of scholarship extolled the potential of
social media for democratization and deliberation, inad‐
vertently reinforcing a narrative where the affordances
of social media platforms would necessarily champion
communication and collaboration (Loader & Mercea,
2011). McLuhan’s technological optimism, maintained
with solipsistic certitude, heralded the ensuing globaliza‐
tion of markets, politics, telecommunications, and pop‐
ular culture (Ferguson, 1991). The diffusion of informa‐
tion was no longer constrained by the high costs of
production or limited bandwidth, the very tangible and
perennial limitations associatedwith print and broadcast
media (Bastos et al., 2013). These affordances, however,
would eventually be leveraged by propagandists to coor‐
dinate and organize disinformation campaigns through
social platforms with no interest in cooperation, integra‐
tion, or collaboration (Benkler et al., 2018).
2.2. Identity Tribes
Themetaphor of a globally integrated village is directly at
odds and particularly ill‐suited to account for the set of
problems that appeared in the past decade, namely the
upsurge in hyperpartisanship (Marietta & Barker, 2019),
a political context marked by the spread of misinforma‐
tion (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), and the declining trust
in government and institutions, including news organi‐
zations (Amazeen, 2020; Zuckerman, 2017). A theoreti‐
cal framework dedicated to foregrounding cooperation
was also poorly positioned to account for influence oper‐
ations that weaponized social media platforms, a devel‐
opment whose prominent examples including the 2016
US elections, the UK EU membership referendum, and
the 2017 general elections in France (Bastos & Mercea,
2019; Ferrara, 2017; Shao et al., 2018).
These developments challenged the very notion of
networked publics and Castells’ (2012) depiction of the
internet as universal commons. The open infrastructure
of the internet, particularly the World Wide Web, was a
fitting arrangement built on the back of personal comput‐
ers. But in the ensuing decades, scalability requirements
led to a shift toward cloud computing thatmarked amile‐
stone in the cost reduction of data transfer, followed by
the upscaling of internet companies’ ability to provide
services to anyone anywhere in the planet. With cloud
services providing economies of scale between five to
ten over small‐scale deployments (Hamilton, 2009), and
mobile platforms slowly replacing desktop‐based appli‐
cations of personal computers, open standards gave way
to cloud‐based, centralized communication systems epit‐
omized by social media platforms.
In the intervening period, social technologies grad‐
ually pivoted from a business model centered on soft‐
ware and services to the leasing and trading of user data.
These changes overwhelmed the openness of networked
publics, with the debate underpinning networks in the
late 1990s being replaced by a focus on the affordances
of mobile apps and social platforms, whose userbase
differed in substantial ways from the living communi‐
ties of users that would come together around common
interests. The emphasis on open communication even‐
tually shifted to concerns about information warfare,
an epochal transition that reflected material transforma‐
tions in the social infrastructure of increasingly central‐
ized communication networks.
Also noticeable in the transition from networked
publics to social platformswas the steady commercializa‐
tion of previously public, open, and often collaborative
spaces, largely reduced to private property (Galloway,
2017). In the span of a decade, social platforms built their
social infrastructure on the back of networked publics
and the community organization that shaped internet
services in the early 1990s. The ensuing infrastructural
transformation of the networked publics continues to
drive anxieties about social platforms in the aftermath
of the Cambridge Analytica data scandal, including issues
of digital privacy, data access, surveillance, microtarget‐
ing, and the growing influence of algorithms in society
(Gillespie, 2010, 2014; O’Neil, 2016; Pariser, 2012).
This represents a considerable departure from the
landscape shaped by online communities in the mid‐90s
and early 2000s where members would share their expe‐
riences. The meteoric rise of social platforms, particu‐
larly the behemoth Facebook, came with the promise of
a wider audience that successfully pulledmembers away
(and apart) from online communities that evolved from
forums ande‐zines in Bulletin Board System. Thepromise
of awider audience came at the cost of a dwindling sense
of alterity and community. The ensuing algorithmization
of communities introduced and championed by social
platforms completed the transition by instantaneously
rendering networked publics into a profitable source of
users’ interactions (Lingel, 2017; O’Neil, 2016).
Perhaps unintentionally, the transference of com‐
munity governance from users to algorithms (Caplan &
Gillespie, 2020) removed a key basis for mutual trust
and opened the way for large‐scale disinformation cam‐
paigns that conspicuously plagued election cycles, eth‐
nic relations, and civic mobilization from 2016 onwards
(Apuzzo& Santariano, 2019). By Facebook’s own account
(Weedon et al., 2017), its advertising algorithms were
harnessed to segment users into belief communities
that could be microtargeted with materials that ampli‐
fied their intimate political preferences. This repurpos‐
ing of intimate knowledge and networked interaction for
revenue‐making remained the corollary of commercial
social media enterprises, including the individuals and
academics involved in the infamous political consultancy
firm Cambridge Analytica (Rosenberg, 2018).
The tendency of social media users showing a pref‐
erence for a subset of content that is at odds with the
coverage of newspapers was already apparent before
social media became a primary channel for news con‐
sumption (Bastos, 2015). Benkler et al. (2018) argued that
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages X–X 3
it was Facebook algorithm―more than Facebook commu‐
nities or specificmalicious actors distributing problematic
content―that rewarded clickbait websites and tabloid‐
like sources of information, which often include hyper‐
partisan content. The algorithmization of social media
communities was particularly damaging because it rein‐
forced patterns of interaction and the sharing of content
in tightly clustered communities that supported and likely
reinforced the relative insularity of users. For Benkler et al.
(2018), concerns over the Facebook News Feed algorithm
in particular, and over algorithmic shaping of reading
and viewing in general, are not only legitimate but likely
underplayed in the aftermath of rampant disinformation
campaigns that leveraged social platforms’ algorithms.
This account of social platforms is a considerable
departure from the heydays of the internet as a force
of liberation. Propaganda efforts led by the Internet
Research Agency, a ‘troll factory’ reportedly linked to the
Russian government (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Bertrand,
2017; Farkas & Bastos, 2018), weaponized social plat‐
forms to meddle in national elections in Western
democracies. Since then, the record of demonstrable
falsehoods shared on social platforms with real‐world
consequences has increased steadily. Facebook grew
more proactive in Myanmar after the United Nations
and Western organizations accused it of having played
a role in spreading the hatred and disinformation that
contributed to acts of ethnic cleansing (Miles, 2018).
Narratives of the internet as a community, global or
otherwise, were rapidly superseded by accounts of the
internet as a tribe, with the meanings associated with
community―i.e., identification, communication, and col‐
laboration―being likewise replaced by terms address‐
ing the hostility between tribes: polarization, weaponiza‐
tion, and nationalism.
Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, insisted on the
path of greater connectivity and ignored the reverse
course in his call to the Facebook community, melan‐
cholically titled ‘Building Global Community,’ with a suit‐
able reference to tribes, cities, and nations. The mis‐
sive read much like a reality check for a company that
assumed greater interconnection between users would
necessarily bring about greater understanding among
people in real‐world communities. The letter exudes a
Silicon Valley feel‐good vibe about progress and human‐
ity coming together, not just as cities or nations, but as
a global community (Zuckerberg, 2021). It also underes‐
timates the extent to which social life is marked by con‐
tradictions, swiftly and demonstrably amplified as online
and offline social networks, local and global communi‐
ties, collapse into a common contextual ground.
3. Context Collapse and the Darkest Timeline
3.1. Context Collapse in the Global Village
Social media platforms have struggled to cope with the
distinctively different social norms that orient online and
offline worlds. The conflict was perhaps to be expected:
The affordances of online platforms pale in compar‐
ison to the overwhelming stream of visual, auditory,
and kinesthetic information that supports face‐to‐face
interaction. The implicit norms and conventions of
face‐to‐face communication are often absent in online
interaction, particularly turn‐taking and the expectation
that conversation will not be recorded or filmed with‐
out one’s consent. Interaction on social platforms, on
the other hand, is recorded by default and it is not
always clear who owns the data generated. Digital trace
data resulting from online interactionmay also be stored
beyond the life of participants. This caveat of online inter‐
action is augmented by the business model of social
platforms supported by advertisement, which requires
online activity to be linked to the real‐world identity of
users, with Facebook being notable in ensuring all users
are personally identifiable as real human beings, or per‐
haps more tangibly as real‐world consumers.
Facebook is not alone in struggling to manage the
collision between online and offline identities. Google
has a track record of underestimating how entrenched
relationships with kith and kin may differ in substantive
ways fromonline transactions. The short‐livedmicroblog‐
ging tool Google Buzz shared users’ online activity with
people they were trying to avoid. Google engineers
assumed email frequency was a reliable proxy for mean‐
ingful relationships, which of course does not take into
account pranksters, stalkers, debt collection agencies,
crooks, and scam artists. Similarly, Google’s Glass project
failed to note that recording conversations between indi‐
viduals requires one’s consent. Much like Facebook’s
Real Names Policy, Google Plus—another short‐lived
microblogging and messaging tool owned by Google—
sought to force users to link their Google activity to their
real name, so that user’s activity would be irrevocably
linked to their real‐world identity, a condition at odds
with the regular forgetfulness of face‐to‐face interaction.
Even Sidewalk―Google’s project of a robot‐maintained,
data driven city of the future in Toronto―was eventu‐
ally scrapped. Sensors would track residents’ movement
to optimize traffic flow and clean the streets, while also
extending Google’s omnipresent surveillance from the
online world to the physical one.
The struggle to cope with online and offline norms
is often accompanied by overwhelming good intentions
that set these problems in motion. In the early 2000s,
when Facebook was setting its agenda to reshape the
internet around personal relationships, and then the
entire world, few would argue against the mission of
making the world more open and connected. A more
open and intensively connected world was a logical
consequence of the technolibertarianism epitomized by
the Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace (Barlow,
1996) and the broader political aspirations of the Silicon
Valley technorati (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). This polit‐
ical project collapsed in the second half of 2016, when
Facebook’sNews Feed algorithmwas exploited in various
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influence operations in the run‐up to national elections,
turning a platform originally designed for connecting
people into a remarkable driver of political division
(Bastos & Farkas, 2019).
3.2. The Darkest Timeline
By the end of the decade, the narrative surrounding
social platforms had turned to metaphors foreground‐
ing polarization and division in a landscape marked by
tribalism and information warfare (Benkler, et al., 2018).
This narrative required the adoption of specialized vocab‐
ulary associated with influence operations to describe
a set of practices designed to exploit deep‐seated ten‐
sions in liberal democracies (Bennett & Livingston, 2018;
Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018). The effectiveness of mal‐,
mis‐, and disinformation campaigns depended in part on
the ability to take advantage of the biases intrinsic to
social media platforms (Comor, 2001; Innis, 2008), partic‐
ularly the attention economy and the social media sup‐
ply chain based on viral content (Jenkins et al., 2012).
This model also maximized user engagement by tapping
into primal emotions, such as anger or fear, that scram‐
ble users’ perceptions of reality while being oblivious
to the real‐world repercussions of algorithmic filtering
(Ananny& Crawford, 2018; Gillespie, 2014). In the closed
environment of algorithms agnostic to hatred and vit‐
riol, reality‐distorting misinformation could flourish by
reliably tapping into users’ darkest impulses and polar‐
ized politics.
The substitution of real‐world community leaders
that emerged with the first wave of online communities
with algorithms automating the management of social
interaction online removed the underlying nexus nego‐
tiating the expression of identities online and offline.
As social platforms began to scale up operations to cater
for an increasingly larger user base, the flux of informa‐
tion within was for the first time managed by algorithms
dedicated tomaximizing engagement, which often trans‐
lated to maximizing conflict. The rapid deployment of
this algorithmic network infrastructure led to remark‐
able disconnect between social groups and undermined
the fragilely woven fabric of society. The rise of network
propaganda embedded to social platform affordances,
along with the 2016 election cycle that placed Trump in
the White House and brought a near‐impossible Brexit
to the UK, led the technorati to embrace dystopian nar‐
ratives that described current events with term such as
‘Darkest Timeline,’ a reference to the theory that there
may exist multiple universes outside of our own and that
we live in the worst possible universe of them all.
The Darkest Timeline anecdote foregrounds a split
in consensus reality perceived as cognitive dissonance
in the cultural and political landscape. This perception
is accompanied by a substantive uptake in conspiracy‐
theorizing (Uscinski, 2018), chief of these being the
QAnon meta narrative. This knits together contempo‐
rary politics and racist tropes, positioning ‘the people’
against globalist elites it refers to as ‘The Cabal,’ a force
that traffics in pedophilia, blood sacrifice, Satanism, and
other attention‐getting transgressions. Similarly, anti‐
vaccination conspiracy‐theorizing has rapidly evolved
into a cult wheremembers feel an obligation to share the
truthwith their neighbors and significant others. The eco‐
nomics of social capital underpinning real‐world commu‐
nities drives much of the activity in these loosely knit
communitarian narratives, which embrace the participa‐
tory nature of the contemporary internet, where story‐
telling is built upon decentralized fan fiction spiraling
within closed universes of mutually reinforcing interpre‐
tations (Zuckerman, 2019).
Despite its limited overlap with consensus reality,
conspiracy‐theorizing such as QAnon narratives success‐
fully found footholds in the offline world. ‘Q’ t‐shirts
appeared recurrently in Trump reelection rallies during
2019 and 2020, and culminated in the violent storming
of the US Congress on January 2021, when supporters
featured Q paraphernalia, carried signs, and celebrated
the theory. QAnon surfaced in political campaigns, crim‐
inal cases, merchandising, and college classes. The book
QAnon: An Invitation to a Great Awakening, written
by QAnon followers and supporters, peaked at #2 on
Amazon’s list of bestselling books in early 2019. QAnon
supporters were often regular citizens who found in Q’s
messages a source of partisan energy that confirmed
their suspicions about powerful institutions. Many were
senior or elderly users who came across the theory
through partisan Facebook groups or Twitter threads
(McIntire & Roose, 2020). The ease of information shar‐
ing supported by social platforms not only allowed con‐
tent to become untethered from offline communities.
It also allowed content untethered from reality to pen‐
etrate real communities at scale and speed.
3.3. Outgroups in the Global Village
Barry Wellman has made a fundamental contribution
to understanding how technology has changed the spa‐
tial constraints in social networks. Curiously based in
the same university whereMarshall McLuhan developed
his seminal theories, much of Wellman’s work is an
empirically supported debate with McLuhan’s insight‐
ful probes, with the concept of ‘Global Village’ resonat‐
ing with Wellman’s construct of ‘Community Liberated,’
and several of Wellman’s studies consisting of attempts
to see what the global village looks like around the
world (Wellman, 1999). Much of this work addressed the
perennial tension between face‐to‐face and computer‐
mediated communication. Of particular interest is the
study authored by Wellman and Potter (1999) where
three types of communities are identified based on the
extent to which they relied on face‐to‐face and phone
contacts: lost, saved, and liberated. Individuals who lived
near each other continued to have more frequent con‐
tact, but social technologies altered the notion of prox‐
imity in fundamental ways.
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Our own attempt to understand this relationship
was initially focused on investigating the relationship
between the geographic location of protestors attend‐
ing demonstrations in the 2013 protests in Brazil and the
geographic location of users that tweeted the protests
(Bastos et al., 2014). Spatiotemporal analysis showed
only limited overlap between online and offline protest
activity, with users’ location differing considerably from
the geography of the protest they participated online.
The geography of street protests was indeed signifi‐
cantly distant from the geography of users tweeting
the protests, with hashtagged tweets being particularly
poor at predicting the actual location of users. While
the events analyzed in this study took place in 2013,
they foreshadowed the disconnect between online and
offline protest activity that would drive many influence
operations and the information warfare in the ensuing
years (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Walker, et al., 2019).
This study forced us to challenge the narrative about
digital communities suggested by the concept of ‘global
village,’ the powerful McLuhanian metaphor describ‐
ing how new communication technologies empower
and bring together geographically disparate individuals
across vast territories and cultural differences (McLuhan,
1962). If anything, our results suggested a different
emphasis: Instead of bridging disparate geographies,
social media consolidated extant socioeconomic and
political divisions in the country, with users in geograph‐
ically distant locations directing their attention toward
the metropolitan centers of the public opinion.
In a follow‐up study that similarly leveraged tem‐
poral and spatial data about the Brexit debate (Bastos
et al., 2018), we explored the geographic dependencies
of echo‐chamber communication on Twitter within the
Leave and Remain referendum campaigns. After iden‐
tifying the location of users and estimating their par‐
tisan affiliation, we examined if polarized online echo
chambers mapped onto geographically situated social
networks. Echo‐chamber communication was indeed
rampant during the Brexit debate, but whereas most
interactions were within a 200km radius, echo‐chamber
communication was predominantly restricted to neigh‐
boring areas within a 50km radius, with significant dif‐
ferences across the partisan divide: 168km on average
for pro‐Leave echo chambers, compared with 208km
for pro‐Remain. Perhaps more puzzling, the trend was
reversed for non‐echo‐chamber communication, which
covered shorter distances on the Remain side.
One possible explanation for the conflicting evi‐
dence on echo chambers is that politically homogeneous
communication may reflect group formations inherited
from offline social relations. As such, the boundaries
of one’s network can be simultaneously permeated
by echo chambers stemming from offline relationships
while being exposed to competing opinions on polariz‐
ing topics that circulate on social media. At any rate,
the prevalence of ideologically homogeneous communi‐
cation contradicted the euphoric literature praising the
democratization of public discourse brought by network‐
ing technology and social media platforms (Howard &
Hussain, 2013). But it also challenged the prevailing nar‐
rative on echo chambers arguing that social media inter‐
actions lead users to engage with political content that
resonates with them (Sunstein, 2009). The ideological
and geographic patterning observed in the Brexit debate
offers evidence for communication spanning the entire
country, while also supporting ideologically homoge‐
neous echo‐chamber communication within geographi‐
cally enclosed areas.
These studies lend partial support to the real‐world
consequences posited by both narratives, either by
supporting cooperation or by ripping apart the social
fabric of society. We found strong evidence for cooper‐
ation across geography and within ideological clusters,
but we also found high levels of insularity between ide‐
ological clusters. These studies suggest forms of social
organization that depart radically from the ‘open society’
postulated by Karl Popper’s rendering of liberal democ‐
racy (Popper, 2020). Within this line of inquiry, network
communication may indeed support the creation of a
global society or village, but this globally connected soci‐
etymight reproduce outgroup negativity and derogation,
with intergroup behavior reflecting geographically homo‐
geneous communities that can suddenly outspread their
spatial constrains.
4. Conclusion
Internet scholarship in the late 1990s and early
noughties oscillated between narratives of integration
and division, with McLuhan’s seminal metaphor of a
global village being superseded by a horizon of trib‐
alism and information warfare. These narratives were
inspired by geography and emphasized either integra‐
tion and cooperation or identity and tribalism; either
communication and collaboration or polarization and
division. Common to both narratives is the foreground‐
ing of real‐world consequences, whether by support‐
ing cooperation or by ripping apart the social fabric of
society. As mutually exclusive narratives, they project
inconsistent and disjointed physical places resulting from
the weaving of network technology into the fine tex‐
tures of the physical world, epitomized by social plat‐
forms and the vast centralized architectures underpin‐
ning cloud services.
Concerns about the viability of the internet up to
recently have been largely restricted to infrastructure
scaling, robustness, and resilience. With internet traffic
growing at a fast and steady pace from the late 1990s
to the late 2000s, the technology sector focused on
issues of load and strain on the infrastructure. These
developments shaped the debate around the benefits
and potential hazards of centralized approaches to con‐
tent delivery compared with a distributed architectural
model. Scalability requirements eventually led to the
shift toward cloud computing that marked a milestone
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in cost reduction for data transfer, followed by the rapid
scaling of internet companies’ ability to provide services
to anyone anywhere in the planet. The post‐PC of the late
2000s and 2010s evolved to include wearable and ubiq‐
uitous devices favoring portability and seamless connec‐
tion to cloud‐based services.
It is an open question whether social groups can
scale up as seamlessly as our communication infrastruc‐
ture. Our cognitive threshold, indeed our capacity to
empathize, remains evolutionarily linked to a relatively
small pool of individuals ranging from a few dozen to
a couple hundred individuals (de Sola Pool & Kochen,
1978).Whilewe can communicate globally at virtually no
cost, our social lives remain mapped to very real, limited,
and tangible material surroundings. In sharp contrast to
cloud computing infrastructure, our cognitive architec‐
ture is not designed to scale, but to root social experi‐
ences in a relatively small and stable number of mean‐
ingful social ties (Dunbar, 2016). The disconnect between
scalable technical infrastructure and the limits of our
social networks, but also the social technology underpin‐
ning our social fabric, has produced asymmetric social
divides including polarization and the breakdown of com‐
munities. In other words, as online communities scale
both in size and geographic breadth, critical breakdowns
in the limits of social integration, cohesion, and consen‐
sus reality may follow.
As one’s local experiences are intertwined with
global communities or villages, the tenuous arrange‐
ments piecing together heterogeneous social groups
may give way to social tensions, which are the source
of much cruelty, oppression, but also of comfort and
kindness. The permanent impetus toward greater con‐
nectivity evangelized by social platforms and encapsu‐
lated in themetaphor of a global village leaves little room
for this inherent contradiction in social life. Narratives
foregrounding division and polarization, on the other
hand, overlook the substantial contributions of network
communications to citizen journalism, civic education,
and media activism that hold governments and power
to account. On balance, network communication does
seem to advance a global society or village, with the
caveat that this globally connected society continues to
reinforce intergroup boundaries and outgroup stereotyp‐
ing typical of geographically situated communities.
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